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Abstract
The first part of the paper constitutes an analysis of the term “transitory category” as 
presented by Adam Heinz, and a justification of the view that there is a need to eliminate 
the term from the metalanguage of syntax. The second part of the paper is a recon-
struction of the reasoning mechanism Adam Heinz developed in order to postulate the 
existence of a transitory category between the complement and the adverbial. The last 
part of the text shows an effective method of analysing relations between parts of the 
sentence without a necessity to use the term “transitory category”. 
1. The term “transitory category” has gone down in the history of Polish linguistics 
of the last 50 years as inseparably linked with the name of Adam Heinz (Heinz 1961, 
1965, 1967; cf. also Bednarczuk 1986; Rokoszowa 1986; Smoczyński 1986). The scholar 
devoted a separate paper to this term (Heinz 1967). He, however, had used it earlier 
in reference to the characteristics of relations between subsystems of the language 
system, between grammar and lexicology, inflection and derivation, as well as 
dependencies between classes of units of particular subsystems, especially the 
syntactic one, e.g. between the adverbial and the predicative (syn wrócił z wojska 
oficerem ‘the son has returned from the army an officer’), between the attributive 
and the adverbial (goście pytali ciekawi ‘the guests asked interested’), between the 
complement and the adverbial (mówię te słowa tobie – ‘I am saying these words 
to you’ (Heinz 1967).
At the beginning of his discussion concerning transitory categories Adam Heinz 
(1967: 45, 47) describes them as “very elementary and simple phenomena which each 
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linguist encounters on a daily basis” [All translations are mine – M.G.] and defines 
the transitory category this way: 
(…) kategoria przejściowa jest to kategoria x zajmująca w systemie pozycję pomię-
dzy dwoma innymi kategoriami względem niej skrajnymi A i B w ten sposób, że jej 
elementy w pewien określony sposób przynależą częścią do kategorii A, a częścią 
do B. (…) Istota omawianej przejściowości polega (…) na pewnym częściowym 
zatarciu granicy między dwoma poza tym wyraźnie rozgraniczonymi kategoriami, 
przez co powstaje kategoria nowa, trzecia, zawierająca części elementów lub cech 
równocześnie kategorii A i B (…) (Heinz, 1967: 45, 47).
The transitory category is a category x that takes in a system a position between 
two other categories A and B which are extreme in relation to it in such a way that 
its elements defined in a certain way belong partly to category A and partly to cat-
egory B (…) The essence of the discussed transitoriness consists (…) in some partial 
obliteration of the boundary between the two otherwise clearly separate categories, 
as a result of which a new, third, category containing elements or features of simul-
taneously category A and B arises (…). 
Adam Heinz a priori assumes the existence of transitory categories in language which 
are situated between two other stable categories of the already specified characteris-
tics, and thus what he assumes is that the existence of the former is also unarguable. 
These assumptions are, however, too strong, they do not have and cannot have an 
axiom status. In linguistics as a discipline of the humanities and an ideography (and 
not a nomothetic science, cf. Bogusławski 1986) absolute obviousness is very infre-
quent and the existence of transitory categories does not belong there. It is in fact 
confirmed by an argument the scholar provided himself. Firstly, despite his declara-
tions that transitory categories are “very elementary and simple phenomena,” Heinz 
introduces a term “transitory category” into the language of linguistics by means 
of a definition, he therefore does not treat it as a pre-theoretical term (Lyons 1977). 
Secondly, the scholar assumes that a transitory category is a consequence of an 
obliteration of a boundary between “two clearly separate categories” A and B. The 
distinction between these categories and a transitory one is a result of the scholar’s 
reasoning, and thus his decision. Incidentally, since the scholar “clearly separated” 
the two categories, there is no need to create a third one. 
The “transitory category” is a tool in the researcher’s hands, it therefore belongs 
to the metalanguage of linguistics, and not to the language of the subject, whose 
existence is independent of linguists. This diametrically changes the point of depar-
ture for the whole reasoning because an answer to the question as to whether the 
“transitory category” is an element of a given metalanguage or not depends solely on 
the will of the person who uses it. As can be concluded, there are thus two possible 
answers, a positive and a negative one. None of them, however, should be arbitrary, 
each, therefore, requires a justification. Adam Heinz, however, did not justify the 
need to use the “transitory category” most probably because he recognised that 
value as evident. Nevertheless, due to the fact that my own position in this case is 
different, I will present its justification below.
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Enthusiasts of “transitory categories” often express astonishment at the fact 
that the categories may be questioned. In order to avoid misunderstandings I want 
to stress once again that for me the absolutely overriding axiom is the opposition 
between language facts and the way facts get interpreted. Facts form the language 
of the subject and thus cannot be questioned. Both types resemble each other, and 
they are in some way related to the each other (e.g. the preposition niedaleko ‘near’, 
which does not occur with a noun despite a slot open for it, resembles an adverb). 
Such perfunctory observations lead to a conclusion that language categories are 
fuzzy. All this (together with such individual, loose associations), however, is still 
not an interpretation of language facts. An interpretation requires an a priori ac-
ceptance of a specific metalanguage. Besides, the fact that boundaries between 
some observed facts appear to be fuzzy to us does not implicate that facts are to be 
interpreted in a fuzzy way too. 
What follows in this paper consists of two parts. In the first one I will quote some 
arguments from the field of general methodology and methodology of linguistics 
which support the fact that the “transitory category” is to be rejected. In the other 
I will attempt to reconstruct the reasoning mechanism Adam Heinz developed in 
order to formulate the transitory category between the complement and the adverbial. 
Finally, I will demonstrate how at present the opposition between these parts of the 
sentence may be analysed without referring to the transitory category. 
The temptation to form a third value, e.g. C, at the border line between two 
others, A and B, is a natural consequence of the fact that those two have not been 
determined as a result of a sharp delimitation sample, on the basis of a clear and 
verifiable criterion. A counterargument at times put forward by the opponents of this 
condition, which states that boundaries between language values (and particularly 
between the referents of these values) have fuzzy borders, does not excuse us from 
making an attempt to make the analysis precise and its results confirmed. A natural 
consequence of aspiring for a delimitation of linguistic phenomena is a preference 
for classification over typology. If as a result of a division of a given set, apart from 
two subsets a third one is formed as well, this means that conditions for a logically 
accurate division (i.e. a dichotomous one on the grounds of contradistinctive fea-
tures) have not been satisfied. 
A creation of a new class, a borderline one (and an inevitable need to give it a name 
that it leads to) is not in keeping with the principle of reductionism (by means of Ock-
ham’s razor). One may not abide by this principle, however, this will inevitably cause 
an increase in false and empty (analytically true and analytically false) judgements.
A class formed at a border of two others is in all probability a heterogenic class, 
which requires further divisions. Such operations may be conducted ad infinitum. 
Divisions resulting from enumeration, which threaten with an infinite regression, 
are well known in linguistic literature, e.g. a division of parts of the sentence in 
handbooks concerning Polish syntax, especially the traditional approaches, cf. Kle-
mensiewicz (1963), Jodłowski (1976).
What speaks against the formation of transitory categories is a maxim formu-
lated by Ferdinand de Saussure, which is in my view a superior one in relation to all 
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his other theses concerning the essence of language and its units. It may be briefly 
named a maxim of difference.
In a language, as in every other semiological system, what distinguishes a sign is 
what constitutes it (Saussure 1983: 119).
Morphologically there are neither signs nor meanings but differences in signs and 
differences in meanings, (1) each of which exist solely in their relations to others, 
hence inseparable, but (2) never come into direct contact with each other (Saus-
sure 2006: 46).
What stems from the above is a most general methodological postulate, in keeping 
with Saussure’s maxim. One needs to look for an adequate criterion confirming 
the existence of a relation of exclusion between categories A and B until the need 
to identify an intermediate category C disappears. Such a positive example, which 
corroborates the claim that such a search is possible and effective indeed is a theory 
of Polish conjunctions by Wajszczuk (1997). Among others, it falsifies a view, repeated 
for decades (cf. e.g. Pisarkowa 1974; Walczak 1978; Ruszkowski 2001a, 2001b), that 
there exist various types of complex sentences representing transitory categories be-
tween parataxis and hypotaxis. The author has built a hierarchised semantic system 
of Polish conjunctions whose background is a continuously perfected conception of 
lexeme classification (Wajszczuk 2005, 2010). Wajszczuk’s conjunctions theory is one 
of the most significant achievements of Polish syntax of the last couple of decades.
2. When building his theory of parts of the sentence, Adam Heinz approved of the 
theory of primary and secondary parts of speech by Kuryłowicz (1979) as well as 
the theory of syntactic functions of grammatical cases and semantic functions of 
concrete cases, also authored by Kuryłowicz (1948). Following the latter, grammati-
cal cases may appear in concrete roles and vice versa (Heinz 1965: 48). The scholar 
assumed that:
Istota rekcji branej ze stanowiska poprzednika polega na tym, że dany poprzednik 
postuluje pewną określoną formę, czyli konkretnie morfem fleksyjny swego następ-
nika nie biorąc pod uwagę jego funkcji. (…) W składni przynależności, na odwrót, 
relewantna jest tylko funkcja (semantyczna), a nieistotna jest forma gramatyczna 
następnika (Heinz 1965: 59). 
The essence of the government approached from the position of the antecedent con-
sists in the fact that a given antecedent postulates a certain defined form, i.e. in 
concrete terms, an inflectional morpheme of its consequent, without taking its func-
tion into consideration. (…) In the syntax of non-concordial modification, on the 
contrary, what is relevant is only the (semantic) function, whereas the grammatical 
form of the consequent is unimportant. 
In connection with the above the scholar recognised the fact that the relationship be-
tween basic dependencies in a sentence, i.e. the government and the non-concordial 
modification, is analogous to relations between grammatical and concrete cases. 
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He presented his thought in a form of a proportion “grammatical case : concrete 
case = government : non-concordial modification” (Heinz 1965: 78). It became the 
foundation for the definitions of the complement and the adverbial proposed by 
the scholar:
(…) dopełnienie jest to pozycja adwerbalna, której zawartością prymarną jest za-
leżny przypadek gramatyczny (accusativus, genetivus), a sekundarnie przypadek 
konkretny (dativus, instrumentalis, etc.); przypadki te (…) podlegają rekcji, która 
w wypadku, gdy określnikiem jest przypadek konkretny, niweluje, a w każdym razie 
czyni nierelewantnym jego znaczenie stosunkowe; natomiast okolicznik jest pozycją 
tak samo adwerbalną, ale jej zawartością prymarną są poza przysłówkiem przypadki 
konkretne, zaś sekundarnie mogą nią być również zależne przypadki gramatyczne; 
pozycję tę łączy z członem określanym zasada semantycznej przynależności, a więc 
kontekst, który w wypadku przypadka gramatycznego narzuca mu jednostronnie 
określone znaczenie stosunkowe (Heinz 1967: 59).
(…) the complement is an adverbal position whose primary content is to mark an 
oblique grammatical case (accusative, genitive), and, secondarily a concrete case 
(dative, instrumental); these cases (…) are subject to the government which in the 
event of the determiner being a concrete case, eliminates, and in any case, makes its 
relative meaning irrelevant; on the other hand, the adverbial is likewise an adverbal 
position, however, its primary content are, beside an adverb, concrete cases, whereas 
grammatical cases may also constitute secondary ones; this position is connected 
with the element defined by the principle of semantic non-concordial modification, 
and thus a context which in the event of the grammatical case imposes a one-sidedly 
defined relative meaning on it. 
In these definitions a key role is played by mutually exclusive concepts of government 
and non-concordial modification, the former excluding the existence of a semantic 
dependence between the verb and a suitable nominal form, the latter the existence 
of a grammatical dependence. The opposition between grammatical and concrete 
cases is for the juxtaposition between the complement and the adverbial – against 
the given proportion – irrelevant, as both parts of the sentence allow for both case 
forms, and the distinction between their primary functions and the secondary 
ones amounts to precisely the distinction between the government and the non-
concordial modification. This opposition, however, is fuzzy, and the assignment of 
particular expressions to specific parts of the sentence is based exclusively on the 
scholar’s intuition. Problems with distinguishing a complement from an adverbial 
were characterised by Adam Heinz this way: 
Choć sytuacja [rozróżnienie rekcji i przynależności – M.G.] pod względem teore-
tycznym wydaje się jasna, to jednak w praktyce istnieje tu pewna ilość określników 
takich, co do których zachodzi niepewność i wahanie, czy podlegają one jeszcze 
rekcji, czy też chodzi w nich już o znaczenie stosunkowe i na odwrót. W takim zaś 
wypadku określniki te zajmują pozycję przejściową czy pośrednią między wyraź-
nym dopełnieniem z jednej, a wyraźnym okolicznikiem [podkreślenia moje – M.G.] 
z drugiej strony (Heinz 1967: 59–60).
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Although the situation [i.e. the differentiation between the government and the non-
concordial modification – M.G.] in theoretical terms appears to be clear, in practice 
there exist a certain number of such determiners which cause doubt and hesitation as 
to whether they are still subject to a government or whether they already concern the 
relative meaning and vice versa. In such a case, on the other hand, these determiners 
take a transitory position or an intermediate one between a clear complement on the 
one hand, and a clear adverbial [my emphasis – M.G.] on the other. 
In the transitory class the scholar placed e.g. nouns used after verbs like chełpić się 
‘brag’, smucić się ‘grieve’, brzydzić się ‘loathe’, cieszyć się ‘enjoy’, where “the determiner 
in the form of the instrumental is at the same time subject to the government and 
contains a relative meaning of the cause” [my translation – MG] (in his monograph 
Heinz 1965: 86 recognised these as adverbials) and “prepositional determinations in 
which the relational meaning has been obliterated partly, cf. śmiać się z kogoś ‘laught 
at somebody’, płacić za coś ‘pay for something’, zapomnieć o czymś ‘forget about 
something’, zastanawiać się nad czymś ‘think over something’, etc.” [my transla-
tion – MG] (Heinz 1967: 60). My intuitive evaluation of all these enumerated ex-
pressions is different, as I undisputedly consider them to be complements. However, 
as is known from general methodology, see, among others, the classical works of 
Karl Popper or Hans Reichenbach (cf. his oppositions between the context of dis-
covery and the context of justification), the intuitive evaluation of hypotheses is 
only the beginning of the scholar’s reasoning. 
The objective of a scientific study, also one like linguistics, is to justify and explain 
what is being claimed. A proposal of a classification of linguistic phenomena does not 
in itself constitute a solution to a problem. Let us assume that we decide to recognise 
expression A as a complement, and expression B as an adverbial. The awareness that 
we still have a third class at our disposal, a transitory one, in which expressions C, D 
and others can be placed, does not force one to justify such and not another clas-
sification of these expressions in any original way, and all the more so to clarify its 
foundations, that is what the criteria and the juxtaposition between the government 
and non-concordial midifcation constitute. 
3. In Adam Heinz’s works one can find numerous proposals for classifying adverbal 
determiners (cf. especially Heinz 1965: 86–88), it is, however, difficult to argue against 
such proposals because they are limited to the provision of the name of a part of the 
sentence which a given determiner represents. The main reason for such a state of 
affairs has its source in a significant difference between the linguistic methodology 
in Poland of the mid 1960s and the methodology of the later decades.
It is only at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s that methods of justifying results of 
an introductory syntactic and semantic analysis began to be searched for (Linde-
Usiekniewicz 2008). Substitution and transformation methods, methods of semantic 
componential analysis, contrastive methods which involve searching for deviations, 
among them the method of reducing sentences to contradictions and tautologies 
were not used in Polish linguistics when Adam Heinz presented his conception of 
transitory categories. 
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The opposition between the government and the non-concordial modification, 
and at the same time between the complement and adverbial in the understanding 
assumed in Adam Heinz’s works does not find a confirmation in theories of semantic 
syntax sensu largo, formed under the influence of generative linguistics and formal 
logic. It is already the example of the theory of semantic roles by Fillmore (1968), 
assuming the existence of a semantic dependence between the predicate and the 
argument (disregarding the evaluation of this theory; cf. e.g. Karolak 1975, 1993), and 
defining this dependence in terms of the so called deep cases, that cannot be rec-
onciled with Adam Heinz’s assumption (taken from Kuryłowicz) that grammatical 
cases do not perform semantic functions. Contrasting the form and the function of 
expressions (Heinz 1967: 48–50, which, by the way, does not have a justification in 
the light of the dual character of the linguistic sign) and as a consequence a sepa-
ration of the syntactic description from the semantic one were the main source of 
difficulties in classifying parts of speech.
In predicate-argument structures the problem of the complement and the ad-
verbial can be solved by means of answering the question as to whether a given 
constituent of a sentence represents an argument of the predicate or not. A posi-
tive answer to this will allow for the recognition of this constituent as a “former” 
complement, a negative answer as a “former” adverbial. The argument is a concept 
which is semantically implied by the predicate (Bogusławski 1973). The implication 
is an entirely clear relationship, a non-gradable one: either it occurs or it does not. 
There are therefore no obligatory or facultative arguments: obligatoriness doubles the 
sense contained in the concept of the implication, and facultativeness is contradic-
tory to it. If in the light of this reasoning one applies the criterion of the implication 
to the opposition between the complement and the adverbial, then automatically all 
the prototypical or clear complements and adverbials will cease to exist, as well as 
any transitory forms between elements of this opposition. An argument of a given 
predicate must have its representation in its semantic explication. A hypothesis 
that a given unit fulfils the condition for a semantic component of the predicate is 
corroborated by means of a falsification test. Obtaining a contradiction as a result 
of the test supports the truth of the postulated thesis. 
A method of scientific investigation cited briefly here has been known in Pol-
ish linguistics since the 1970s, and has been used in semantic analysis many times, 
particularly in works devoted to the description of numerous classes of verbs, e.g. 
epistemic ones (Danielewiczowa 2002), visual perception (Dobaczewski 2002), au-
ditory perception (Żurowski 2012), and agentive and causative ones (Duraj-Nowo-
sielska 2007), which express knowledge unverified by the speaker (Stępień 2010).
In the history of syntactic research one of the controversial types of nouns from 
the point of view of the opposition between the complement and the adverbial have 
been nouns in the instrumental case. The analysis of semantic relations (by means 
of the method very briefly adduced here) between particular verbs and a class of 
expressions in instrumental makes it possible to answer a question as to whether 
instrumental represents an argument of the predicate or whether it is added to the 
predicate (and thus has a status of the adverbial). For instance verbs like ktoś rąbie 
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(kraje, łupie, szatkuje, trze) coś czymś ‘somebody chops (cuts, cracks, shreds, grates) 
something with something’ take three arguments, and one of their arguments is an 
instrument of the action (Grochowski 1975). On the other hand, verbs like ktoś dzieli 
(suszy, je, pije) coś ‘somebody divides (dries, eats, drinks) something’ do not imply 
an instrument of the action. Sentences like Piotr je ciasto widelcem ‘Piotr is eating 
a cake with a fork’, Ewa pije herbatę łyżeczką ‘Ewa is drinking tea with a teaspoon’ 
only apparently question the presented hypothesis: widelcem, łyżeczką ‘with a fork, 
with a teaspoon’ represent arguments of predicates wkładać ‘put in’ and wlewać 
‘pour in’, and not jeść ‘eat’ and pić ‘drink’ (Grochowski 1986).
In the presented paper I have tried to justify that the “transitory category” is an 
empty entity and that its elimination from the metalanguage of syntax is not only 
possible and desirable, but it should allow to make the interpretation of language 
facts follow principles of logic, and be more accurate and in-depth. 
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